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• 72% of China’s growth was due to the domestic private sector 
(Wei and Zhang, 2009)
• Most small private firms clustered together geographically, and 
are highly coordinated within each cluster that collectively they 
have formed many “world factories”
• 62% growth in the number of firms in China during 1995-2004 
was due to clustering (Long and Zhang, 2009)
• 14% of China’s total industrial GDP growth during 1995-2004 
was due to these firms (Long and Zhang,2009)
Clusters of Small Businesses in China 
as  “World Factories”
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A typical ‘world factory’ of this sort
• Thousands of specialized family owned “firms” cluster in a 
town which focuses on a few products
• The town government coordinate strategic matters through 
providing infrastructures (physical, technical and admin)
• Thousands of merchants coordinate daily operations through 
subcontracting with dozens of other small “firms” 
• Each such a town is a “world factory” 
• Datang Town: 6 billion pairs of socks per year 
• Shengzhou Town: 40% of the world's neckties
• Qiaotou town: produced more than 70% of the buttons for clothes 
made in China
• Songxia town: 350 million umbrellas every year 
• Puyuan Town: over 500 million cashmere sweaters; 60% of 
China’s market
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A Cluster as a virtual conglomerate
• These clusters are purposely organized by town governments 
and many transactions within a cluster are non market  
• The town government is like the “headquarters” of a 
conglomerate, which coordinates strategic matters 
• Facilitate large number of small private firms and deepen division of 
labor among them 
• Facilitate logistics and other infrastructures  
• Provide technical training
• Maintain quality within the town: reputation
• The merchants who coordinate daily production operations are 
like “divisions” of a conglomerate
• Such a conglomerate is virtual 
• The ownership is distributed among thousands of families
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The Virtual Conglomerate and 
the Boundary of the Firm
• Conventional view: a firm is a set of assets with a common 
ownership, which determines a concentrated control rights 
• The coincided common ownership and concentrated control rights 
coordinate non market transactions within a firm 
• How about a virtual conglomerate?
• It does not have a common asset ownership: not a firm?
• It has concentrated control rights (exercised by town government and 
merchants), which coordinate large amount of non market transactions: 
similar to that of a firm 
• What is the nature of the firm? (Coase,1937): ownership 
structure or control rights, which matters more? 
• What is the boundary of the firm (Coase,1937):  If a virtual 
conglomerate is regarded as a firm, then what is the boundary 
of the firm? How about a county? How about a municipality 
(prefecture)?  
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Benefits of the virtual conglomerate 
than integrated companies 
• Most of the assets are owned by individuals 
• Individual entrepreneurs make decisions on daily operations
• Compared with hired employees in integrated firms individual 
entrepreneurs 
• Have stronger incentives to work hard, to take risks and to take 
initiatives
• Enjoy creativities, flexibilities and adaptabilities for market changes
• It is beneficial in areas where constant entrepreneurial 
actions need to be taken
• The ‘headquarters’ does not have a responsibility for risks 
taken by individual entrepreneurs: harder budget constraints 
than an integrated firm
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Benefits of the virtual conglomerate 
than conventional small firms
• The virtual conglomerate creates huge scale 
economy, while keeping each workshop small 
• With numerous similar workshops are clustered in a 
virtual conglomerate, the competition among them 
make them more productive and also help to solve 
incentive problems 
• The fine division of labor and prevalent using trade 
credits among workshops within the virtual 
conglomerate lower entry barriers substantially
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Structure of a Virtual Conglomerate
• Thousands of workshops clustered together sharing 
infrastructures of the virtual conglomerate 
• Every workshop is specialized in one task to make it efficient 
• Dozens of virtual plants operate in the virtual conglomerate
• They are competitors in the same market but share infrastructures of 
the conglomerate 
• Each virtual plant consists of a group of specialized workshops; 
they are coordinated by a lead entrepreneur and work together 
closely 
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Operation of a virtual plant
• A group of workshops work closely as a ‘virtual plant’
• They located nearby to each other
• They know each other well
• The working relationship among them is an entrepreneurial network
• They are closely coordinated but no written contracts between them
• Often a merchant is the leading entrepreneur in coordinating 
production processes within the virtual plant
• She provides designs and receive orders 
• She purchases raw materials and deliver them to the subcontracting 
workshops;  
• She does packaging and quality inspection
• She sends the final products to the conglomerate’s logistics center
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Puyuan as a virtual conglomerate
• Puyuan town is the largest cashmere sweater production center in the 
world 
• Produce over 500 million cashmere sweaters each year; 60% of China’s market 
• With 3,900 family owned specialized workshops and 6,000 trading shops
• Every workshop is specialized in one task:
• Designing, weaving, finishing, dyeing, printing, ironing, packaging, etc.
• A virtual plant: a group of specialized workshops closely worked together 
coordinated by a lead entrepreneur
• Sweater merchants as virtue production coordinators
• Design and produce cashmere sweaters from yarns 
• A virtual conglomerate: thousands of workshops clustered together sharing 
infrastructures  
• The town government provides many important public goods and services, 
fostering the clustering development 
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The Location of Puyuan
Zhejiang Province
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History of Puyuan Cashmere Sweater Cluster
1976 1988 year1994 2007
A collectively 
owned enterprise 
began to produce 
cashmere sweaters
Local government 
constructed the 
first marketplace  
The largest 
distributing centre 
of cashmere 
sweaters in China.    
Ten million pieces 
500 million pieces.
4,000 firms & workshops
6,000 merchants              
60,000 workers   
More than ten billion yuan sales
local population had 
jumped from less 
than 30 thousand in 
1992 to more than 
130 thousand in 
2005 
INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE Page 13
Production Organizers
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Market
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Family  workshops
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Individual Workers/Entrepreneurs
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Agricultural 
society
Industrial societyBig VI Firms 
SMES, Clustering
Financial constraints
Financial constraints
Financial constraints and 
advantages of small firms
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The Average Investment for Different Step of Production
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Does Dispersed Production Mode
Incur Higher Transaction Cost?
• Not necessarily for three reasons. 
• When producers stay in a geographically proximate region, 
information flow is much easier. Words about bad behavior 
spreads fast.
• The opportunity cost of committing dishonest behavior is high 
because of the nature of asset specificity in a cluster (the asset, 
skills and network are not portable to other places). 
• Since they locate nearby to each other, they know each other 
well. Repeated transactions help form trust. 
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Source of Starting Capital
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  Average amount 
(10,000 yuan)
Founder 
(%) 
Relatives or 
friends 
(%)
Banks
(%)
Others 
(%)
Yarn dealers 12.45 83.21 16.79 0.00 0.00
Family weaving 
workshops 7.31 81.46 15.64 2.90 0.00
Dyeing factories 340.07 47.50 31.87 20.63 0.00
Finishing factories 177.82 29.91 34.14 25.68 10.27
Printing workshops 10.60 77.36 22.64 0.00 0.00
Ironing workshops 3.83 88.26 11.74 0.00 0.00
Sweater shops (VPCs) 12.74 80.58 12.47 6.95 0.00
Three-wheeler drivers 0.54 63.28 36.72 0.00 0.00
Logistics company 4000.00 50.00 0.00 50.00 0.00
Integrated enterprises 263.84 59.59 19.28 21.13 0.00
 
2-month salary
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The entrepreneurial firms are closely coordinated but no written 
contracts between them
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Sample receipt
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Puyuan town government as 
headquarters of the virtual conglomerate:
Managing Crises and Provision of Public Goods
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Local governments facilitate the growth of conglomerates by providing 
necessary public goods in response to various crises:
• Roadside sweater stands blocked traffic: 
• Built cashmere sweater marketplaces  (with roof) through private-public partnership to formalize 
the informal business, which attracted large number of small private firms and deepened division 
of labor among them 
• Fights among different private logistic centers and transport 
companies: 
• Set up a unified logistic center by re-organizing dozens of private logistics and transport 
companies and auctioning out the rights of transport routes
• Increasing crimes as a result of more merchants and migrant workers: 
• Increased street security patrol to ensure a safe environment
• A large fraud by a woman trader using fake name: 
• Established information system to link hotels with police stations to check fake Ids to chase out 
cheaters
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Managing Crises and Provision of Public Goods
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• Reputation crises due to low quality product: 
• Enacted decrees on the quality requirement of cashmere products; 
• Set up quality inspection centers and quality control offices; 
• Established an industrial park to attract cashmere firms with brand 
names to Puyuan from all over the nation by preferable land, tax, 
and credit policies
• Short of skilled labors and inadequate trainings:
• Built technical training centers/schools to train employees at the 
township level
• Land shortage: 
• Replaced the scattered farmers’ residential houses with town 
houses. Using the saved land to build factories and industrial park 
(in which famers hold shares). 
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Other Important Public Goods
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• Generic promotion through annual international cashmere sweater 
exhibit in Puyuan; build partnerships with experts in leading universities
• Concentrated ironing workshops in a designated area with centralized 
heat provision to save energy and keep scale of production small.
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Local Governments’ Incentives
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• Inter-government competition is a key feature of Chinese 
economy. Local government officials’ performance is based on 
GDP growth, fiscal revenue growth and other economic 
indicators
• With low incentives many developing countries’ local governments play 
little role in local economic development
• But the inter-government competition in China may not be 
sustainable in long run when government faces multiple tasks 
and when they are not elected (Xu, 2010) 
• How will this affect the future of China’s virtual conglomerates? 
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Concluding remarks:
the boundary of a virtual conglomerate
• Concentrated control rights is critically important for 
creating large scale clusters
• Distributed ownership is critically important for 
accommodating large number of entrepreneurs
• Where do the concentrated control rights of the local 
governments come from? 
• What are the objectives of a local government?
• What is the boundary of a virtual conglomerate? 
• Why most clusters are township-wide and we do not observe a 
county-wide cluster? 
• What is the difference between a town government and a county 
government? 
